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Structural Realism and the New Cold War
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Abstract
The Cold War mentality such as misperception which is deep-rooted in the 
American and Russian government has triggered the revival of U.S.-Russian conflicts. 
The new Cold War would be a continuation from the past that operates with an action- 
and-reactions model. However, with the change of geopolitical situation, the new 
Cold War would be conducted in different means.
The structural constraints suggested by the structural realist would be an 
explanation for the emergence of new Cold War. The structural realism makes 
contributions of the idea of misperception，over-exaggeration, and balance of power 
that is a product of an anarchic international system. The concept of security dilemma 
would also deliver a theoretical foundation of the action-and-reaction approach 
between the United States and Russia.
The geopolitical struggles between the Untied States and Russia in the CIS 
region, Europe and Asia would be illustrated to explain the new Cold War style of 
confrontation. Furthermore, the geostrategic analysis emphasizes the Russian 
resurgence through energy to exert greater influences in a variety of regions. Last of 
all, the Russo-Georgian war and Ukrainian crisis would be selected as the case study 
to clarify the Russian revisionism in the near abroad.
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L2* Research Background and Research Questions
After the collapse of Soviet Union， which was described as “the greatest 
geopolitical catastrophe” by Putin， Russia lost the status of global power and suffered 
from economic and political failure. (President of Russia，2005; Schnabel，2001)
When President Putin came to power, due to the high oil price, Russia achieved 
rapid economic growth that accounted for 60% increase of Gross Domestic Products 
(GDP) in his first two presidency. (Herspring, 2007; Maltsev, 2011) The economic 
recovery not surprisingly resulted in a more belligerent and ambitious Russia to regain 
the great power status and defend its security interests. (Robinson, 2012) For instance, 
Russian government launched the military reform for modernization and increased 
defense budgets with the purpose of enhancing strategic military capability. (Nichol, 
2011) Russia also have new security posture that being more assertive to the West, 
such as publicly criticizing United States’ unilateralism, using vetoes with China in 
the United Nations over Syria issues, and making claims in the Arctic region. 
(Tsygankov, 2013; Hale et al.5 2013; Greene, 2011)
Besides， the threat of the West’s expansion forced Russian government to 
respond hostilely for Russia’s survival. (Boon et al., 2011) The West initiated the 
institutional enlargement since 1990s, such as the expansion of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union to the Eastern European and
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‘Eastern bloc’ countries. (Lasas，2010) The enlargement program which excluded 
Russia only created the impression that the West used the modern means to contain 
Russia which is similar to the containments in Cold War period. (Charap& Shapiro, 
2014) The NAT05s invasion of Kosovo, United States5 withdrawal of the Anti- 
Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and the establishment of the anti-missile shield 
intensified Russia’s distrust to the West. (Rukavishnikov，n.d.) Russia would lose the 
geopolitical and security interests, such as losing influences over the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) and being weaker in the future conflicts. (DeBardeleben， 
2008) To defend strategic interest of Russia, Kremlin is willing to respond the West 
through the military means. For example, Russia invaded Georgia after NATO’s 
Bucharest Summit declaring that Georgia was allowed to join the Membership Action 
Plan (MAP). (NATO, 2008; Schiffer& Shorr, 2009)
The recent Ukraine crisis that Russia annexed Crimea after President Yanukovich 
was removed alongside with mass protests has frayed the U S.-Russia relations and 
Kremlin’s relations with Europe. (Hille，2014) The escalation of mutually distrust 
between Russia and the West is perceived as a return to the Cold War since both side 
criticized another as an adversary and the West repeatedly adopted sanctions against 
Russia. (Duclos, 2014; Press TV, 2014; Croft & Mohammed, 2014)
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These are the Research Questions to be examined in conducting the research:
1. What is the difference between the Cold War and the new Cold War?
2. How the new Cold War emerged?
3. What is the threat from the West perceived by Russia?
4. What is the strategy of Russia to respond the West?
1.3 Research Significance
The research attempted to signify the revival of the Cold War. Scholars and 
journalists such as Stephen Cohen and Edward Lucas have provided their arguments 
to explain the emergence of the new Cold War. For instance, Cohen (2006) put the 
blame on the United States-led expansion in his article while Lucas's (2009) book 
stressed the ambitions and aggressiveness of Putin administration. The research would 
supplement their idea through referring the recent incidents that are absent from their 
writings, such as the Russo-Georgian War, the Syrian Crisis, the Arctic incident and 
the Ukraine crisis. Also, new arguments would be presented such as the geopolitics 
shift that the West would potentially be divided and the developing of Sino-Russian 
alliance.
Besides, recognizing the change of the international system would be the 
contribution of the research. The hegemonic era of the United States was ended 
because of the relative decline of the United States and the challenges from the rising
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powers. (Nye, 2012) If one enter the era of a new Cold War, the international system 
would transmit from unipolar to either bipolar or multipolar when Russia and China 
are rivals against the United States.
The research also make an effort to illustrate the development of Russia and 
Russia’s threats to the West. The Russian resurgence of economic and military， which 
was mentioned in articles by Dadak (2010) and Crone (2008), would be examined. 
Moreover, as Goldman (2008) suggested in his book, natural gas become the secret 
weapon of Putin administration, which could be a threat to the West while Eastern 
Europe heavily dependent on Russia’s energy supplies. Another threat to the West is 
Russia’s strategy of ‘Near Abroad’ to re-exert its influence in the neighboring 
countries with impunity thanks to the nuclear deterrence.
Last but not least， this research provided a review of the United States’ foreign 
policy in last two decades. One would study the eastward expansion of NATO 
directed by American Presidents, which has been regarded as aggressive by 
Vankovska (2014). The geopolitical analysis also elaborate the issue of NATO 
expansion, such as the promise of non-intervention between NATO and Gorbachev 
(Sarotte, 2014) and Putin’s red line (BBC，2014).
1.4 Research Design and Methods
The research would be conducted in qualitative nature, based on the analysis of
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non-numerical information. The research proposes to explore the phenomenon and 
offer an in-depth understanding and rationale of political context. The ‘new Cold 
War’， the ‘Near Abroad strategy’， ‘divide and rule’， ‘pipeline politics’ and the new 
‘Eastern bloc’ are the predominant phenomenon the research would examine mainly 
through the realist approach emphasizing interests and powers. Moreover， the use of 
quantitate nature in this research would be problematic. Firstly, one could not use of 
the numerical information to quantify the above phenomenon. Secondly, the operation 
of conducting a quantitate research is challenging in this case to regulate the 
independent variables and dependent variables.
Case study would be a research strategy of the research to explore causation and 
find out the underlying principles. The Georgia War and the Ukraine crisis would be 
chosen to explore Russia5 military adventurism in the Near Abroad. Furthermore, one 
select the Nord Stream and Nabucco pipeline to explore the pipeline politics.
The data formation in the research would be textual and non-numerical for the 
most part. Books Journals articles and newspaper articles was the main sources of the 
research. The internet materials such as e-Book, online documentary videos are 
readily accessible and used as reference.
Structural Realism and the New Cold War
Chapter 2; Literature Review
2.1 Conceptual Framework: The New Cold War
The New Cold War is a continuation of cold war in terms of conflicts and 
confrontations between the United States and Russia. The Cold War’s action-reaction 
spiral set and misperceptions have persisted among two countries and develop a 
foundation of a new Cold War. Yet, the New Cold War would be conducted in new 
manifestation with the geopolitical change among two countries in post-Cold-War 
period.
2.1.1 The New “Cold War”
The Cold War mentality of misperceptions and the dynamics of action and 
reactions motivated under the anarchic system persist among the United States and 
Russia, which provide the foundation of new confrontation.
Perceptions and Misperception
The structural constraint under the anarchic system produces sense of insecurity 
among countries. A state existing in the international structure is uncertain about 
another state’s intentions. (Waltz，1979) These structural factors force each state to 
distrust and over exaggerate other state’s foreign policies， and assume for the worst 
situation that other’s actions are intended to harm a state’s security. (Mearsheimer， 
2006) Consequently, states are intended to have misperceptions over another in order
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to protect its own security. The misperceptions among the American and Russian 
foreign policy makers trigger the over exaggeration of another’s policy as threats.
The old Cold War was a diplomatic displacement and replacement that led by 
mutual misperceptions. (Harasymiw, 2010) For instance, the speeches of Stalin 
backed by the ideology of communism to consolidate the Soviet people arouse the 
West’s suspicions over Russian expansionism， and vice versa. (Judge & Langdon， 
2011) The misperceptions among two camps were also well-illustrated by the issues 
of Eastern Europe. When the Soviet Union consolidated its sphere of influence by 
invading the Eastern Europe through security calculation, the West rejected the idea 
due to the fears of Soviet’s further expansion in Central Europe. (Kissinger, 1994) The 
diverse interpretations and misperceptions over Eastern Europe among two countries 
stimulated threat perceptions and criticisms over another’s expansionism. The old 
Cold War was eventually occurred after the West and East leaders issued 
confrontational rhetoric and policies to check another camp’s imperialism. (Todd， 
2011) The Kennan’s X-Article，Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech and Truman 
Doctrine inspired the beginning of Cold War.
The misunderstandings between the United States and Russia are still extensive 
in the post-Cold-War period. When American modified its worldview in the era of 
globalization, the mindset of zero sum thinking has not been abandoned by the
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Russian leadership. (Stent, n.d.) The distraction of global security issues in America 
and flooding of conspiracy theories in the Kremlin accumulate two camp’s flawed 
understanding towards each other without improvement. (Roxburgh, 2014) The 
persistence of mutual misinterpretation is demonstrated by the American’s enduring 
views of the Russian imperial threats, while Russian criticizes the unilateral American 
policies in its near abroad. (Judge & Langdon, 2011) The American expansion of 
influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region backed by 
democracy promotion is perceived as a security threat to Russia with beautiful 
language. (Allison, 2013) The mutual misperceptions and over exaggeration of 
another’s policies in the CIS region， Europe and Asia Pacific would intensify the 
hostility between the United States and Russia. The confrontation triggered by the 
geopolitical conflicts in these regions would possibly initiate a larger scale of 
confrontation.
Actions and Reactions
In the old Cold War, the bipolar system, either of the superpowers are forced to 
follow another’s strategies and respond in the similar approach in order to maintain 
the equivalent capabilities and balancing. (Yost, 2011) There were numerous of 
example illustrating actions and reactions process between the United States and 
Soviet Union. For instance, the Marshall Plan was an American initiative to support
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the reform of European economies, while the Molotov Plan was similarly initiated by 
the Soviet Union to aid its allies in the Eastern Europe. Another example was the 
establishment of Warsaw Pact in response to the U.S.-led NATO, which were both a 
collective defense treaty to maintain military control in the Eastern Europe and across 
North America and Europe respectively.
In the post-Cold-War era, the actions and reactions spiral set has been resumed 
among the United States and Russia. (Charap & Shapiro, 2014) There are two reasons 
motivating the declining Russia to pursue a similar strategy with the United States. 
Firstly, by taking the United States as the reference point of Russian foreign policy 
making, Russia could acquire a status of great power equivalent to its rivals. (J. 
MankofF, 2012) In other words, the Russian Government is seeking diplomatic 
disparity and reciprocity to the hegemonic United States. Secondly, the failure of 
responding the United States would be regarded as a symbol of retreat in the Russian 
leader’s logic of revenge. (Shevtsova，2010) In the Russian’s view， the response is 
necessary in the logic that if Russia retreat, the United States would advance. 
Therefore， Russia is adopting a tit-for-tat approach towards the American foreign 
policy to counter the United States’ imperialism. The Russian philosophy could be 
acknowledged in the situation that the Russian aggression responded the West’s
expansion in the post-Soviet space.
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For example, the invasion of Georgia and declaration of independence of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia happened just after Georgia was allowed to participate 
the Membership Action Plan in the Bucharest summit declaration. Similarly, when 
Ukrainian publics demanded closer ties with the EU and overthrew the current 
President Yanukovych who refused to sign an association agreement with the EU， 
Russia invaded Crimea subsequently. These diplomatic events were perceived as 
President Putin’s payback to the West on the struggle in the CIS region.
2丄2 The “New” Cold War
When the Cold-War-style mentality such as misperceptions and action and 
reactions model persist, the struggle between the United States and Russia would take 
place differently in the new Cold War. The geopolitical changes contribute to four 
differences of the new Cold War, including the change of power status, the fading of 
ideology war, the differences of nuclear deterrence and geopolitics shift.
The Change of Power Status
In the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union are the two superpowers 
that correspondingly shared power and capabilities in the bipolar international system. 
However, the status of Russia has been changed after the end of Cold War and 
collapse of Soviet Union. The United States become the only superpower that 
dominates the global system and enjoys hegemonic power and supremacy in military
15
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and economic that the declining Russia could not compete with. (Dadak, 2010)
Militarily, the United States maintain military supremacy compared with Russia 
in terms of military expenditure. The military spending of the United States accounted 
for more than seven times of Russia’s and the United States possess a more advanced 
conventional forces. (OECD, 2015) Economically, although Russia has enjoyed 
greater economic growth at 4.72% (2002-2012) compared with 1.73% growth of 
American economy, the Russian aggregate GDP is less than a quarter as large as the 
America^. (OECD, 2015)
Russia lost its great power status as a consequence due to the rapid drop of 
power capabilities compared with the United States. Russia could at most be regarded 
as a regional power through domination of the region with the nuclear superiority. 
(Borger, 2014) When compared with the nuclear capabilities, the difference between 
Russia and the United States becomes insignificant. Russia possess almost an equal 
quantity of nuclear weapons with the United States after the New START Treaty was 
signed. (Nichols，Stuart, & McCausland, 2012) The nuclear parity reinforced Russia’s 
imperialism regional policy in exerting greater influences in its near abroad. The 
Russian government could also turn its weaknesses into strengths. Russia benefits 
from the downgrade of power status and consequently concentrates the resources in 
the region and shares less responsibility in the global issues. (Saunders, 2014)
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The war on terror has indicated the differences of role between the United States 
and Russia. The hegemonic United States， as a major global player， lead the world to 
fight against terrorism against the crogue states’. On the other hand， Russia played a 
secondary role mainly responsible for resources supplement and intelligence sharing. 
The Fading of Ideology War
Another mean of Cold War could be regarded as the ideological struggle between 
liberal democracy and communism. Two superpowers expanded influences and 
attracted its allies worldwide through ideological power. Apart from ideological 
expansion, ideology provides the foreign policy makers with greater understandings 
of another’s strategy since the policies of the United States and Soviet Union in some 
extent were guided by the ideological principles. (Van Den Bercken, William, n.d.) 
For instance, the Marxism’s concept of world revolution to overthrow capitalism 
worldwide raised the West’s fear over Soviet expansionist ambitions and resulted in 
the containment over Soviet Union.
The end of Cold War justified the reality that communism was faded away after 
the collapse of Soviet Union and the democratization in Eastern Europe. With the fall 
of communism, the Western liberal democracy is dominated and become the universal 
ideology. The United States continue to expand its influence through democracy 
promotion in the Middle East and the colored revolutions in post-Soviet space.
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Nevertheless, Russia has showed no desires in rebuilding an ideology that could 
challenge the United States’ liberal democracy. The Russian government developed 
cSovereign Democracy’， a new state ideology which emphasized on independence 
and non-interference in the global affairs. (Okara, 2007)The new Russian ideology 
upholding authoritarianism and nationalism would not obtain widespread support 
globally as the Soviet Union did. The new state ideology is regarded as a defensive 
concept in legitimizing Russian independent policy making to resist the Western 
influences rather than as an attractive belief in re-attracting its allies globally.
(Horvath, 2011)
Without the ideological burdens， Russian foreign policy making is adopting a 
pragmatic approach. Russian foreign policies are more flexible and changeable when 
the Kremlin looks for the maximization of national interests in a case-by-case basis. 
(Roberts, 2010)The Russian foreign policies driven by pragmatism illustrate a sharp 
distinct with the United States in the post-Cold-War period, which is constrained by 
liberalism.
The Differences of Nuclear Deterrence
In the Cold War era, the nuclear weapons work as a mutual assured destruction to 
avoid the direct armed conflicts between the United States and Soviet Union. The 
fears of causing complete annihilation from nuclear strikes stop neither side initiating
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the nuclear warfare. The two superpowers, for mutual self-interest, cooperated in 
eliminating nuclear materials globally and maintained the status quo. (Marx & 
Saetren, 2015)
When the Cold War is passed and some treaties on the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons have been signed， the difference of nuclear capabilities between the 
United States and Russia has no significant change. As a regional power, Russia have 
possessed nuclear disparity strategically compared with the United States.
The nuclear security is alarming when Russia is demanding a status change 
through its nuclear capabilities. The Russian government is seeking to change the 
status quo by means of the nuclear weapons. (The Economist, 2015) The nuclear 
threat is Russia’s strategy to intimidate the West through manipulating nuclear strike 
as an offensive weapon rather than a traditional mean of deterrence. The strategy is 
backed by the belief among the Kremlin that the Washington would not jeopardize 
over small states through nuclear strike since the United States as a hegemony has 
more to lose than the declining Russia. (Edwards & Kemp，2006)
The Kremlin has proved their belief correct through the intervention of its 
neighboring countries. The Russia’s aggressive invasions in Georgia and Ukraine are 
convincing the world that with nuclear weapons Russia could advance its near abroad 
with impunity. Oppositely, the crisis also demonstrated the reluctance of the United
19
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States to confront Russia through nuclear strikes. Hence， the nuclear threat become 
the most powerful weapons of Russia to challenge the United States, especially in the 
Eurasian region.
The Geopolitics Shift
The Cold War indicated a bipolar containment that divides the East and West. 
The Eastern bloc refers to the group of states aligned with the Soviet Union, which 
has almost been collapsed after a series of democratic revolutions in the Eastern 
European countries. Besides, Russia has maintained ambiguous relationship with the 
post-Soviet states. While the Central Asian countries remain as Russia’s sphere of 
influence, the Baltics states， Ukraine and Georgia are struggling to resist Russia’s 
influences through turning to the West.
On the other hand, the Western bloc was composed of Western European 
countries who uphold the values of democracy and capitalism. China has joined the 
Western camp in the 1970s following the Sino-Soviet split and the United States5 
rapprochement with China. The composition of the Western bloc has also changed in 
the post-Cold-War period. Russia has been exerting its influence in Europe, such as 
establishing business ties with Western European countries and creating energy 
dependence in Europe. The greater interdependence between Russia and European 
countries has raised the United States5 concerns over the division of the West. In
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addition, the relationship between the United States and China has been tense when 
China’s rapid economic growth posed a threat to challenge the global order. The 
United States’ pivot to Asia introduced by President Obama correspondingly showed 
a more provocative approach against the rising China. In contrast, Sino-Russian 
cooperation are more intensified in terms of military, economic, political and cultural 
perspective. The closing Sino-Russian coalition is capable of competing the 
hegemonic power of the United States and reshaping the status quo.
Therefore, the geopolitics has been shifted after the end of Cold War. While the 
Eastern European countries turned to the West and were coopted in the Western 
institutions, there are the potential of division between the United States and 
European Union, and also the emergence of Sino-Russian alliance.
2.2 Theoretical Framework: Structural Realism
Structural realist theories provide a logical foundation of international politics to 
illustrate the emergence of a new Cold War. Structural realism is comprised of two 
key elements. The structural realists firstly assume an anarchic international system 
that would initiate the security dilemma and competition among the great powers. 
Second, the structural realist also suggests the balance of power as a product of the 
anarchic structure. The notion of security dilemma and balance of power under the 
assumption of anarchy provided an argument to analyze the emergence of the new
21
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Cold War. In general， the structural realism is a theory that could predict an 
occurrence of a phenomenon, such as the new Cold War, rather than forecasting when 
and where the new Cold War will be emerged.
Anarchic International System
Structural realists considered anarchy as a predominant assumption that provides 
initial understanding of international politics. The international system is anarchic that 
there is lack of an external or higher authority above states. In the anarchic 
international structure， states play an independent role in protecting its own security 
and therefore the world system could also be regarded as a self-help system. Each 
state who has the rights to use force in safeguarding national security is intended to 
maximize its relative power compared with others. (Zala, 2013)
The international system is distinguished from the domestic political system. The 
domestic structure maintains hierarchy order and centralized power on the hands of 
government while the order of international structure is decentralized. (Waltz, 1979) 
The government who possesses superior and coercive power plays a role of mediator 
to resolve disputes and enforce law and order in the domestic society. In contrast, with 
the absence of external central authority, the inter-state conflicts emerged in the 
international system could not be halted by the third party but arbitrated only by the 
states itself.
22
Structural Realism and the New Cold War
Security Dilemma
Security dilemma occurred when a state enhance its security and other states 
react in a similar way to heighten its security. Structural realists explain the 
phenomenon by assuming the survival as the ultimate goal of states that other national 
objectives could be achievable only if survival is guaranteed. To ensure survival， the 
maximization of national security is the means for each state to pursuit when there are 
no external authority. (Mearsheimer, 2006) However, security is a zero-sum game that 
the defensive measures taken by one state to strengthen its security would lessen the 
security of others.
When a state perceive its security measures as a defensive way to protect its 
survival, these actions would be interpreted differently by others. A defensive security 
measure would be perceived as offensive， when states are uncertain about another’s 
intention and tend to prepare for the worst of other’s intention. The structural 
constraints produce mutual distrust among states and result in over-exaggeration over 
other’s security measures. The overstressing of other’s policies as a threat triggers the 
competition of security development. Each state under the self-help system are forced 
to follow other states to strengthen the security capabilities or a state’s survival would 
be threatened. Therefore, the security dilemma would be an unintended phenomenon
produced by the structural constraint.
23
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The nuclear arms races between the United States and Soviet Union in the Cold 
War to compete for supremacy over nuclear capabilities have best illustrated the 
security dilemma. When there were the uncertainty of the adversary's capacity of 
nuclear weapons, both states spent massively in the proliferation of nuclear arsenals. 
Each state preferred to possess an aggressive military buildup that best serves for its 
survival when a state was unware of another’s intentions.
As a hegemonic power, the United States continues to strengthen its security 
capabilities. The fear and suspicious of Russian government to the West is widespread 
since Russia has lost his buffering zone and natural barrier provided by Eastern 
European countries after the collapse of Soviet Union and NATO expansion. The 
further expansion of the West in the post-Soviet space including Georgia and Ukraine 
was interpreted differently among the two camps. While the West is intended to coopt 
these states to strengthen its security, Russia perceived the expansion as an aggressive 
action that would pose a threat to Russia’s security. Accordingly, the Russian 
government has launched the military reform, initiated ambitious military spending 
plan, and invaded its neighboring countries in response to the perceived security 
threats from the West.
The Balance of Power
The Balance of power theory projects that a hegemonic state would make use of
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its relative power advantage to offend the weaker state, which would stimulate a 
balancing coalition in resisting the hegemony. In the structural realist thinking, the 
balance of power is a product of stmctural constraint rather than coordinated state5s 
behavior. (Kenneth N. Waltz, 2000)The importance of state’s survival under anarchy 
encourages states to check other’s desires of expansion and hegemony through 
balancing. The balance of power could be established through internal balancing, 
which emphasizes on the enhancement of a state’s internal capabilities， and external 
balancing such as forming alliances with other states. The structural realist asserted 
that the balance of power will be restored even if balances are once interrupted in the 
unipolar system.
The United States enjoy hegemony since the collapse of the Soviet Union as the 
American powers in terms of political, military, economic and technological are 
incomparable with other great powers. The unchecked hegemonic power of the 
United States was demonstrated by the withdrawal of ABM Treaty, NATO expansion 
and Iraq War. The United States have took its advantage of power to exert its 
influences further in the Middle East, the CIS region and also Asia pacific.
However, as structural realist anticipated, the balancing to the hegemonic 
America would be repaired and the counter-hegemonic structures are emerged. 
(Jakobsen, 2014) Internally， Russia initiates an aggressive resurgence economically
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and militarily thanks to the rise of energy prices in the early 2000s. The revisionist 
Russia seeks to recover its great power status and reciprocity for the Russia-U.S. 
relations. With improved capabilities， the Russian government has posed a more 
aggressive attitude to counter the expansion of the West in its 'Near Abroad5 where 
Russia proclaimed to preserve the privileged interests.
The Russian government, apart from internal balancing, has been intended to 
build the Anti-Americanism alliance to counter the hegemonic United States. For 
instance, Russia established an alternative intergovernmental military alliance, the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)， to consolidate the Russia’s sphere of 
influence in the CIS region and prevent the American’s expansion. Furthermore， the 
Kremlin also allies with Iran and Syria in the Middle East, with China in Asia to 
check the United States.
Chapter 3: Geopolitical Struggle in the CIS Region
The most provocative struggle between the United States and Russia in the post-
Cold War era is the enlargement of American influence eastward in the post-Soviet
space. The NATO expansion, Colored Revolution and the establishment of Missile
Defense Shield are the example of the West’s expansion of influence in the CIS
region. Misperceptions occurred when the American foreign policy is intended to
26
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strengthen its defense to tackle new global security issues and the Kremlin perceive 
the United States’ actions as the competition of sphere of influence and a threat to 
Russia’s security. Mutual mistrust driven by the anarchic system persists especially in 
Russia against the United States, despite of the end of global rivalry. The Russian 
government’s responses are reasonable for structural realist when Russia are unsure 
about the Washington’s intentions and survival remains as the predominance 
component in Russian foreign policy making. In response, Russia has carried out an 
aggressive approach to preserve its privileged interests in the near abroad.
3.1 The Institutional Expansion of NATO
In the post-Cold War period, the West expand its influences through NATO 
which could be divided by three phases. The first wave of NATO enlargement 
accessed Poland, Hungary， and the Czech Republic. Afterwards, seven Central and 
Eastern European countries including the Baltics states, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, 
and Romania joined the institutions in the second wave of expansion. The NATO 
expansions have escalated the tensions between Russia and the West, especially in the 
third wave of NATO expansion that commits on future membership of Georgia and 
Ukraine in the Bucharest Summit.
Perception and Misperception
The West has assured the Russian government that the NATO expansions are not
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intended to contain Russia but provide collective security in Europe. The NATO 
declared "three nos， commitment that the organization “have no intention, no plan and 
no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members” in the NATO- 
Russia Founding Act. (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2009) Moreover, the NATO 
enlargements were reciprocal agreements between the West and these new member 
states, rather than a unilateral actions. (Blank, 1997) The fears among the new 
member states towards Russian resurgences have also legitimated the expansion of 
NATO.
On the contrary, the Russian government perceived the NATO enlargement as a 
geopolitical challenge that touched on Russia’s national interests. (Bugajski，2004) 
The Russian’s perception of the U.S.-led NATO is undesirable when the military 
organization keep existing after the dissolution of Warsaw Pact. The NATO’s 
unilateral action in Kosovo that ignored Russia’s interests and opposition has 
deteriorated the NATO-Russian relations. (Johnson, n.d.) The hostile perception and 
suspicious against NATO has been intensified in Russia following the Kosovo crisis. 
Consequently, the Kremlin saw the exploitation of the United States over Russia’s 
weaknesses in the 1990s when Russia was not capable of objecting the acquiring of 
former Soviet republics into NATO. (Hassig, 2009) For instance, Russia blackmailed 
the Baltic States through economic sanctions as a leverage to deter the NATO
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accession instead of directly confronting with the Untied States. The Russian 
government also alleged the United States has adopted a winner-takes-all approach to 
seek for unconditional accommodations from the defeated Russia. (Cohen, 2006) The 
crossing of the cred line， drew by former Russian President Yeltsin around the Baltic 
States was the case.
In the way of Russian thinking, security is a zero-sum term that the approval of 
NATO expansion in the Central and Eastern Europe is equivalent to the loss of 
Russia’s security interests provided by these European states as a buffering zone. 
(Tsygankov，2013)The greater defense involvement of the United States in Europe 
and the potential of deployment of NATO troops and military facilities in the newly- 
coopted member states also posed a threat to Russians security.
Furthermore, the integration between NATO and the former Soviet republics 
except Russia has triggered the Kremlin’s suspicions over the encirclement by the 
West. (Didymus, 2014) The modern containment, military encirclement and strategic 
isolation of Russia are the common argument among the Russian officials in opposing 
the NATO enlargement. The over exaggeration of NATO enlargement that the West is 
intended to weaken Russia’s security landscape in the region and threaten to its 
survival has forced the Kremlin to prepare for the worst over the United States’
intentions.
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3.2 The Colored Revolution
Colored revolutions refers to a phenomenon of non-violent demonstrations that 
involve thousands of people expressing their dissatisfaction in the streets with colored 
symbols. The governments would be overthrew by the mass or forced to compromise 
for political changes. Most of the colored revolutions, including the Georgian Rose 
Revolution, Ukrainian Orange Revolution and Kyrgyzstani Tulip Revolution, took 
place in the post-Soviet space. When the majority of upheavals took place near 
Russian border, the involvement of international supports in these revolutions 
exacerbate the criticism over the West’s challenges to Russia’s sphere of influence.
The contribution of foreign forces during the democratic movement is the major 
dispute between the United States and Russia. The ambiguity of foreign assistance 
owing to the difficulty in measurement provides each side a room to defend its 
arguments and trigger diplomatic conflicts.
Foreign assistances through political and economic channel such as the 
development aid are the major arguments for the Russian government to criticize the 
West. However, the influences of development aid are limited and ineffective in the 
senses that the economic assistances were generally captured by the tyrants rather 
than reaching the local people. (Stiglitz, 2002) When the Western powers might not be 
successful in interference through political and economic way, the civil society is
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rapidly developed in the post-Soviet states thanks to the assistance from the West. 
(Tordjman, 2008)
3.2.1 Georgian Rose Revolution
The Revolution of Roses was a regime change in Georgia in 2003 . The Rose 
Revolution was triggered after widespread protests over the disputes of fraud 
parliamentary elections. Consequently, President Shevardnadze was forced to resign 
and the pro-Western leader Saakashvili became the Georgian President.
There are no significant external interferences in the 2003 Georgian 
parliamentary election. The major Western participation was the establishment of exit 
polls which was conducted under the cooperation between the American Global 
Strategy Group and four Georgian organizations. (Kandelaki，2006) Despite of 
Shevardnadze’s criticism on the Open Society Foundation over interfering Georgia’s 
internal affairs through funding the opposition, the organization deny the claims of 
interferences in the elections. The Open Society Foundation has spent no more than a 
half of million dollars to prepare for the elections, and did not funded the domestic 
civil groups. (Angley, 2013)
However, although the direct foreign interference was no substantial in the Rose 
revolution, the West has exerted political influences through financial assistances by 
the international institutions. The West consistently provided the Georgian
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government with conditional financial aids that the development of the third sector in 
Georgia was part of the package. (Lutsevych，2013) For instance， the National 
Endowment for Democracy has stimulated the politicization of the Georgian NGOs, 
when the Open Society Foundation also encouraged the alliance among NGOs to 
consolidate the political power. The Westernized leaders of the Georgian NGOs who 
are educated in the West also facilitated the impacts from the Western organizations.
The suspension of financial grants from the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund during the revolutions posed a long term financial influence to the 
Georgian government. (Grey & Volkov, 2003) The cut off of financial supports from 
the United States Department of State further manipulate the financial pressures to 
Georgia. As a result, the long term financial influences from the West has played a 
role in overthrowing the Shevardnadze administration and initiating the Rose 
revolution.
3.2.2 Ukrainian Oranse Revolution
The Orange Revolution was also a democratic movements in Ukraine through a 
series of demonstrations taking place in Kiev. Thousands of Ukrainian protesters were 
driven by the disputed run-off vote of presidential election by means of corruption 
and electoral fraud. Accordingly, the pro-Western Yushchenko was elected and 
defeated the pro-Russian candidate Yanukovych in the second run-off of election.
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The role of external forces was also controversial in the Orange Revolution in 
the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election. Similar to Georgia, the indirect assistance in 
the development of Ukrainian civil society was the major contribution of the West. 
(Polese, 2008)For instance, the transfer of knowledge, sharing of experience and 
networking are the training materials for the expansion of the Ukrainian civil 
organizations subsidized by the West.
Besides， the West’s another support is the mobilization of the Ukrainian 
protestors in complaining about massive corruption and election fraud in the Kiev's 
Independence Square. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), a Western-led institution, was responsible for monitoring the presidential 
election campaign in Ukraine. The international observer group complained of voting 
irregularities in the elections and the European Union correspondingly condemned the 
Russia5s interventions in the disputed election. (Ukraine, presidential election..,2005) 
The condemnation was regarded as a fuel of mobilizing Ukrainian protestors and 
resulted in the victory of a pro-Western politician Yushchenko in the re-mn election. 
Perceptions and Misperceptions
The Western diplomats refuted Russian’s allegation of the United States’ direct 
interference in the Colored Revolution. In the West’s points of views, the local people 
in the post-Soviet states is more decisive in the movements than the foreign forces.
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(Sussman & Krader, 2008) Instead of championing the Western assistances in the 
democratic movements, the West put the emphasis on the participation of the 
domestic people. Besides, the West was intended to keep the democratic movements 
conducted peacefully without bloodshed based on humanitarianism rather than 
overthrowing the government. (6  Beachain & Polese, 2010) For instance, the Western 
states asserted pressures on Shevardnadze not to use forces against the protesters in 
Georgia.
On the other hand, Russia has identified the involvement of foreign forces in the 
democratic movements in its Near Abroad. The exaggeration of the West’s role in 
developing civil society generate the anti-Western condemnations from the Russian 
government. The Kremlin perceives the colored revolution not as the expression of 
popular determination and the victory of people power as what the Western countries 
perceived. (Wright, 2015) Instead， the Moscow considers it as a US-driven strategic 
plan threaten to challenge Russia’s sphere of influence. The Russian government used 
to criticize the West using dazzling words and democracy promotion as a cover of its 
imperialism that exerts its influences in the post-Soviet space. (Allison, 2013) In the 
opinions of the Russian leadership, the colored revolution is a geopolitical and 
strategic struggle between the United States and Russia, especially in Ukraine which 
is strategically important to Russia in the Eurasian integration. (Papert, 2014) Some
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Russian officials even exacerbate the United States’ intention behind the movements 
as a mean of weakening the Russian dominance in the post-Soviet space and 
reshaping the CIS regional order.
Actions and Reactions
Responding the West’s aggressiveness in the CIS region， such as the institutional 
expansion and colored revolutions, the Russian government enforce an adventure 
'Near Abroad5 strategy in the region in order to restore the sphere of influence. The 
'Near Abroad5 suggested by the Russian government is the security zone that Russia 
preserves privileged and exclusive interests. The Russian leadership has insisted that 
Russia has the primacy in shaping the order in the CIS region which has long be 
considered as its sphere of influence. (Oguzlu, 2014) The Moscow also stressed the 
preservation of the first strike rights of the use of nuclear weapons in the region to 
counter the West’s expansionism in its near abroad. (Van Herpen，2011)
The Kremlin’s main instrument of exerting political influences in the CIS region 
is the backing of separatism. The supports of Russia over separatist sentiments have 
initiated the ‘frozen conflicts’ in the neighboring states that would threaten the 
integrity of former Soviet republics. (Ora, 2006) The manipulation of the separatist 
sentiments and frozen conflicts offers the Russian government a bargaining chip and 
leverage to influence these states’ policies.(George，2010) For instance， the major
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objective of Russian foreign policy to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining 
NATO has been reached through the threats of frozen conflicts.
Most recently, the initiation of armed conflicts with its neighboring countries has 
become the major Russian strategy in asserting its influence in the region and prevent 
further NATO accession in the post-Soviet space. The Kremlin’s manipulation of 
separatism in its near abroad plus the assertion of its rights to protect the interest of 
the Russian diaspora and Russian citizens throughout post-Soviet states has been the 
strategy of launching armed conflicts with the neighboring countries. (Simonsen， 
2001)The Russian involvement in the means of ‘third party peacekeeping’ ensures a 
short and glory war that offer the Moscow greater bargaining power to deal with the 
former Soviet republics.
For instance, the invasion of Georgia and the declaration of independence of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been achieved after the Five-Day War with the 
participation of the Russian troops through Russian-style of peacekeeping to protect 
the Russian diaspora in the republics. (Nichol, 2009) Similarly, the Russian 
government annexed Crimea due to its rights to protect the interests of Crimean 
population. The manipulation of separatism and frozen conflicts has effectively 
stopped Georgia and Ukraine joining the NATO, when the Kremlin invade Georgia 
and Ukraine with impunity due to its nuclear disparity with the United States.
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3.3 Missile Defense system
The United States has long desired to develop a more confound ballistic missile 
defense since the Clinton administration through the supplement of defensive missile 
interceptors. (Shirinov, 2008) After the withdrawal of the ABM Treaty in Bush 
administration, the United States is more flexible in developing missile defense 
system regardless of the treaty clause. The Bush administration launched a plan of the 
establishment of a ballistic missile defense system in 2007. According to President 
Bush’s proposal, there would be 10 interceptor missiles placed in Poland when a radar 
station would also be constructed in the Czech Republic. The missile defense shield 
has aggravated the tense U.S.-Russian relationships with Russia’s strong opposition. 
Afterwards, the ballistic missile defense system has been modified when President 
Obama came to power. In 2009, the Obama administration announced the "Phased, 
Adaptive Approach" for Missile Defense in Europe as a replacement of President 
Bush’s proposed missile defense system. The European Phased Adaptive Approach 
(EPAA) missile defense system cancelled the planned deployment of missile defense 
interceptors and equipment in the Eastern Europe. The strategic adjustment of the 
missile defense system was regarded as a component of Obama’s reset policy to 
improve the relationships with Russia.
Perceptions and Misperceptions
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The ‘rogue state’s possession of missile capacities has posed a new security 
threat to the United States in the post-Cold War period. The nuclear threat of the 
'rogue states5 has illustrated the shift of missile strikes beyond the context of 
superpowers. (Glaser & Fetter, 2001) The missile report suggested that the Iranian and 
North Korean missile capabilities would reach the level that could launch a missile 
attack directed to the United States after five years. (Thielmann, 2003) The missile 
threat from the 'rogue states5 is the explanation of the Washington over the proposed 
missile defense system in the Eastern Europe.
The United States also make clear that the missile defense system is a defensive 
measure in response to the nuclear threat from the 'rogue states5, but not an intention 
of containing Russia’s missile capabilities. The Washington justified its intentions 
through exposing the operational details and capabilities of the system. To begin with, 
the military expert’s advice that all missile attacks directing to the United States from 
Iran must first fly over Central Europe has justified the geographical allocation of the 
missile interceptors and equipment in Poland and the Czech Republic. (Eshel, 2007) 
As well, in terms of capabilities, the American missile defense is insignificant in 
combating Russian advanced missile strikes. (Adomanis, 2014) Instead, the ballistic 
missile defense system is more capable of preventing the less developed missiles from
the 'rogue states’.
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Conversely, Russia considers the missile defense system based on its strategic 
calculation. The missile defense, in the judgments of Russian officials, is the United 
States’ efforts to destroy the strategic balance between two great powers. (Cirlig，
2012) The Russian strategic deterrent reinforced by the nuclear capabilities would be 
challenged after the United States5 deployment of interceptors in Poland. The United 
States could further pursue of an unchecked nuclear supremacy when the Russian 
strategic parity is undermined. (Eshel, 2007) What the Kremlin worry most is not only 
the fear of the loss of Russia’s strategic balance, but also the exclusion from the 
European defense architecture.
Russia’s worries have been supported by the following three reasons. First， the 
Russian government recognizes that the United States5 have overstressed the Iranian 
threats. (Mizin，2000) Russia does not perceive Iran who has been a client of the 
Soviet Union as a threat, but rather a market for arm trade. The Russian officials also 
dismiss the Iranian threat through the report published by the NIE in 2007 declaring 
that Iran would not pose an imminent missile threat to the United States. (Thompson, 
2007)
Second, the proximity of missile defense system to the Russian ICBMs based in 
Europe has stimulated the Russian fears. Russia worries that Russian ICBMs would 
lose its effectiveness when checked by the deployment of missile interceptors nearby.
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(Lewis & Postol, 2007) Consequently, the Russian’s nuclear capabilities in Europe 
would be paralyzed and Russia eventually lose the strategic balance to counter the 
Untied States.
Third, the Russian government is suspicious about the lack of constraints of the 
missile defense proposed by the United States. The Washington has yet to commit in 
imposing legal bindings that provide long term limitations on the system. The open- 
ended nature of the missile defense raise Russia5s concerns over further enrichment of 
the system’s capabilities, and even worse, the transformation of defensive equipment 
to offensive weapons. (Felgenhauer, 2007)
Actions and Reactions
In response, the Russian government adopts a strategy of containment towards 
the missile defense proposed by the United States. Russia has proposed an alternative 
plan that offers Gabala Radar Station in Azerbaijan to be jointly used by the United 
States and Russia, which has been turned down by the United States. In fact, the 
Kremlin^ principal reaction is the threat of termination of all disarmament and arms 
control treaties, including the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II Treaty and 
the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. (Stephanova, 2007) Another 
response of Russia is the deployment of offensive weapons, such as directing the 
nuclear ballistic and cruise missiles to the European countries. (Hunt, 2012) The
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Russian military even advised a more aggressive response that would launch a pre­
emptive strike against the missile defense.
The Russian government’s reactions of the missile defense are provocative since 
the weakness of Russian conventional forces was disposed during the Georgia war
and Russia is intended to adopt a nuclear first-use policy to maintain its military
capabilities through nuclear weapons. (Fedorov, 2010)
Chapter 4: The Geopolitics Shift
This part would analyze the shift among the Eastern bloc and Western bloc. 
There would be a potential spilt among the European Union and the United States, 
when the former have dependence on Russia energy supply and inclines to adopt a 
conciliatory approach towards Russia. On the other hand, the Sino-Russian relations 
become warmer with the shared anti-Americanism and common interests for a 
multipolar world. The politics, economic and energy ties between Russia and China 
have also been intensified.
4.1 The Division of the West
The division among the West would be illustrated in the following paragraphs. 
To begin with, the division within the European Union would be identified that the 
'old Europe5 tends to be pro-Russian when the 'new Europe5 is more hostile against
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Russia. The lack of unity in Europe prevent the institutions from implementing 
aggressive foreign policy against Russia. (Goldthau, 2008) The pro-Russian Western 
European states has discouraged the provocative anti-Russian approach not only in 
the European Union, but also in the Western bloc. There would be a risk that the 
Europe would be reluctant to follow the United States’ containment against Russia.
4.1.1 The Svilt o f European Union
The remarkable reality is that the European Union fails to commit into the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and to reach consensuses when it comes to the 
relations with Russia. The EU could be divided into two camps that are New Europe 
and Old Europe, which have diverse interpretations and reactions against Russia’s 
aggression in its near abroad. The camp of the new European member states, which 
are mostly the former communist states such as Poland and the Baltics states, 
perceives Russian aggression as a security threat and upholds a tougher containment 
against Russia. (Rettman, 2010) On the other side are the Western European states and 
the EU founding members, including France, Germany, and Italy, which place greater 
concerns over energy supplies and adopt a conciliatory approach to Russia. The 
Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes in 2009 is a case to illustrate the spilt within the EU. 
The gas conflict was perceived by the new EU member states as a Russian aggression 
in Ukraine with the intention of exerting greater political influence and ultimately
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challenging the security over the post-Soviet space. On the contrary, the Old Europe 
responded to the event only after the European energy supplies were also disrupted. 
(Smith, 2010) The major concerns of Old Europe over the dispute are energy issues, 
rather than security. Consequently, except for deploying an independent monitoring 
mission, the EU were refused to intervene and put the blame on Russia over the gas 
disputes. When the old Europe preserve a significant role in the EU policy making, 
the EU’s attitude towards Russia is likely to be appeasing that complies with the 
interests of the old Europe， regardless of the new member states’ fears over security.
The Russian government is intended to divide the EU which fits for Russia’s 
interests. The bilateral approach to deal with the separate EU member states is 
Russia’s divide and rule strategy to exploit the political leverage and differences 
among the EU members against another. (Petersen，2013) Instead of signing bilateral 
agreements with the EU, Russia prefers compromising the gas deals bilaterally with 
distinct European countries. The construction of Nord Stream pipeline illustrate the 
bilateral cooperation compromised between Russia and Germany. The Russian 
bilateral energy agreements with different European countries offer Russia political 
leverages to accomplish its political will based on the differences and the exploitation 
of energy dependence. (Weitz, 2014) While Russia adopts a coercive approach 
towards the Baltics states which are completely reliance on Russian gas supply, the
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Russian policy towards Western Europe is friendlier in order to maintain sustainable 
energy relations. (Kanet，2009) The Russian’s divide and conquer approach has 
generated separated European attitudes toward Russia that some are more tolerant and 
others are more aggressive. The lack of solidarity within EU prevent the institutions 
from initiating aggressive policies that threaten Russia’s interests， given the 
unanimous decision-making style in the EU.
4.1.2 The Division of the United States and European Union
In contrast to trade where the United States and European Union have almost 
equal power, the alliance is dominated by the United States in terms of military and 
defense. (Thimm，2014) The United States enjoying global military supremacy 
perceive its European allies as instmmental and a junior partner. In the post-Cold-War 
era, the threat perception has changed that when the United States continues to 
perceive Russia as a threat apart from the rogue states, Europe consider Russia as an 
economic partner (Larive, 2008) The securitization of Russia which is deep-rooted in 
the United States diplomats produces confrontational policies against Russia which 
would affect Europe’s interests. The diverse of interpretation over Russia among the 
transatlantic alliance contribute to the division of partnership.
The EU-U.S. spilt would be showed by an amount of global affairs. The terrorist 
attacks such as the 9/11 attack have posed a new threat to the global security in the
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21st century and the U.S.-led war on terror against the 'rogue5 states has started the 
division between the EU and US. (Pew Research Center，2002) The Iraq War in 2003 
demonstrated the divided positions among the United States and Western European 
countries when the latter were hesitate to support the invasion of Iraq. (Kanet, 2009) 
The Old Europe has soft-balanced the United States in the Iraq War that France and 
Germany refused to endorse the invasion of Iraq in the United Nations Security 
Council. The Iraq War launched by the United States despite of the lack of support in 
Europe, in the views of Europeans, was a unilateral military action based on its 
hegemonic power. (Schwarz, 2002)
Since then, the transatlantic alliance has become more conflictual over the global 
issues. For instance, the United States could not reach the consensus with the Europe 
in the issues of diversification of European energy supplies, NATO Membership 
Action Plan over Georgia and Ukraine and Russian aggression in its near abroad. The 
division of the West would hamper its capabilities in combating the Russian 
aggression. (J. Mankoff，2012; Smith，2010) For instance, The United States’ 
economic weapons against Russian aggression would be significant only if the 
contribution of EU is involved. The lack of U S.-Russian economic ties illustrates the 
ineffectiveness of its economic weapons in countering Russia without the EU’s help.
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Perceptions and Misperceptions
The Western diplomats have overstated the significance of Russian’s divide and 
rule strategy in the broken relationship between the United States and EU. (EurActiv, 
2015) There is beyond doubt that Russia has created extensive business and energy 
relations with European countries which could shape the policies of European Union 
against Russia. The warmer bilateral relationship between Russia and the Old Europe 
such as France and Germany has also banned EU’s confrontational common foreign 
policies against Russia.
However, the improved Russian-EU relations doesn’t necessarily means the 
deteriorated partnership among the West. The cmcial factor contributing to the spilt of 
transatlantic alliance is the diverse of foreign policy making of the West. Apart from 
the Iraq War, the United States5 confrontational policies against the Russian 
aggression were also undesirable to the EU. Instead of containing Russia, the Old 
Europe is intended to deal with Russia through a conciliatory approach to prevent 
further Russian aggression. (Archick & Mix, 2015) In contrast, the United States 
perceive the EU’s strategy as tolerant and appeasing that would trigger further 
Russian aggression. The difference between the United States’ approach and EU’s 
strategy towards the Russian aggression has signified the division of the transatlantic 
alliance.
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Despite of the latent division among the West, the EU is not turning to the East. 
Despite of economic interdependence, the EU-Russian relations are not harmonious 
due to the clashes of norms and values. (Aggestam，2007) The EU has criticized the 
authoritarianism of Putin regime and the weakening of mle of law and press freedom 
in Russia. The lack of consensus over European norms and values has deterred the 
greater integration between the EU and Russia. Therefore, the coalitions among the 
Europe and Russia would unlikely occur under the conflicts of the human rights 
issues.
4.2 Russia's Asia Pivot: The Sino-Russian Cooperation
Following the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia， Russia also turns to the East 
and put emphasis on the importance in Asia-pacific region. Differing from the United 
States’ Asia pivot， Russia has insufficient strategic presences and is intended to 
cooperate with China, rather than to compete. (Ghoshal, 2013) The following 
paragraphs would first examine the rationale and features of the Sino-Russian 
cooperation. Further, one would argue the United States has overestimated the threat 
of Sino-Russian cooperation but still has to prepare for the worst.
4.2.1 The Rationale behind the Sino-Russian Cooperation
The American foreign policy is the driving force putting Russia and China into 
coalition. (Feng, 2015) The Sino-Russian relations is more integrated militarily and
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economically motivated by the threats perceived from the United States’ foreign 
policy. Hence, the Sino-Russian cooperation is established more in the basis of 
common aversions over the West than the common interests. (Cheng & Cohen, 2013) 
Both Russia and China have perceived threats and pressures from the unilateral 
American policies. When the Russian government has been threatened by the NATO 
expansion and colored revolutions in the post-Soviet space, the American pivot to 
Asia consolidating with its Asian allies and its support of Taiwan put pressures on the 
Chinese government.
The recent events in addition pushed Russian foreign policies turned to the East. 
The objective of economic sanctions imposed by the West is to isolate Russia 
economically and diplomatically. Nevertheless, the sanctions have brought Russia to 
form a closer relationship with China. The Kremlin is intended to preserve good 
relations with Asian countries to avoid marginalization and reduce the dependence on 
Europe. (Klein，2014) Thus， the West’s measures have motivated Russia to have 
greater involvement in Asia-pacific region, especially in the relationship with China.
Apart from the common threats posed by the United States, the Sino-Russian 
cooperation is mutually beneficial in the strategic means. The strategic partnership 
among Russia and China could threaten or offset the United States’ hegemony. 
(Hancock & Lobell, 2014) The coalition delivers a diplomatic multiplier that combine
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Russian military capabilities with Chinese economics power to check the American 
hegemonic power. (Kuhrt, 2013) The United States would also be limited by a 
balance from Sino-Russian coalition when exerting greater influences in the Eurasian
region.
4.2.2 The Features of the Sino-Russian Cooperation
When the global economic primacy has shifted to the Asia-pacific region, the 
Russian government has recognized the economic integration in Asia would be crucial 
for Russia’s development. (Kuchins, 2014) The hydrocarbon products become the 
predominant component of Russia’s economic integration in Asia. Consequently， the 
Asia pivot of Russia has intensified the Sino-Russian energy cooperation.
Russia has signed a 30-year gas deal with China during President Putin’s state 
visit to China in 2014. The compromise of the gas deal signifies the greater 
achievement of energy cooperation among Russia and China. The deteriorated 
relationship between Russia and the West after Ukraine crisis forced Russia to 
reallocate its energy export to the Asian market. The rapidly growing China provides 
an alternative energy export market to Russia. To facilitate the gas deal, Russian has 
dropped the gas price from $400 per 1,000 cubic meters to $350, according to the 
expert’s estimation. (Rodkiewicz，2014) Russia is expected to have greater degree of 
energy connections in the Asia-pacific region that would account for about 25% of
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Russian oil exports and about 20% of its gas exports in 2030. (Ministry of Energy of 
the Russian Federation, 2010)
Apart from energy cooperation, the strategic cooperation is another crucial 
component of the Sino-Russian coalition. The Russian and Chinese government have 
jointly acknowledged the appeal of multipolarity in response to the perceived 
unipolarity of the United States. (Korybko, 2014) Advocating the new multipolar 
international order and seeking for reforms in global institutions is a shared strategy 
of Russia and China to balance the American unilateralism. Acting as a leading role 
above the emerging countries, Russia and China demanded the United States to 
decentralize its dominant powers in the international organization as well as the global 
affairs to other important global players. (Kaczmarski，2015) For instance， Russia and 
China have created the BRICS Development Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) to provide an alternative voice to the Western-led institutions. In 
addition, one of the principal objectives of the establishment of SCO is to introduce 
joint strategy to counterbalance the American hegemony. (A. Cohen，2001) Playing as 
a more important global player, both Russia and China are seeking greater influences 
to check the hegemonic United States.
4.2.3 The United States9 Over-exasseration over Sino-Russian Alliance
The Sino-Russian integration has become more intensified especially when the
50
Structural Realism and the New Cold War
West are growing antagonistic against Russia. Nevertheless, the formal alliance 
among Russia and China would be unlikely to materialize.
To begin with, the economic and military disparity prevent the forming of Sino- 
Russian alliance. Economically, Russia have imbalance trade relationship with China 
in terms of the component of trade that while Russia mainly supply raw materials to 
China, the Chinese major exports to Russia is manufactured goods. (Weitz, 2015) The 
Russian government has been frustrated with the trade imbalance and want to expand 
the bilateral trade to Russian manufactured products, which is not favorable to the 
Chinese citizens and Chinese government. Besides, the Russian government used to 
consider China as the less significant trading partners than the European countries. 
The historical issues and proximity makes Europe remain as the most important 
trading companions to Russia. On the other hands, China was perceived as the last 
resort of partner by the Russian government since Russia cooperate with China only 
when other trading opportunities are blocked. (Hill & Lo, 2013) For instance, the 
Russia-China gas deals signed last year was a product of the West’s sanctions against 
Russia.
The military disparity has also hindered further Sino-Russian coalition. The 
Chinese’s military budget is incomparable with the Russian’s. While China’s military 
spending has skyrocketed to $216 billion as the second largest military spending
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countries, Russia spent only $84.5 billion. (Chamberlain, 2015) Besides, the diverse 
interpretation of the nature of SCO and the inharmonious arms trading relationship 
also pinpoint the military disparity of Russia and China. Despite the fact that Russia 
perceives the SCO as a military institutions to counter the U.S.-led NATO, the 
Chinese government is unenthusiastic in following the Russian line to confront the 
United States with the fears of economic isolation. (Kaczmarski, 2007) Similarly, the 
friction of arms sale has also persisted among two great powers. The Russian 
government is reluctant to export the top military technology to China in order to 
prevent its potential enemy from strengthening military capabilities. (Cole, 2012) 
Consequently, Russia’s arms exports to China have been decreased substantially 
during President Putin’s second presidency.
Aside from the economic and military disparity， the geopolitical competition 
would hold up the possibility of Sino-Russian alliance. China has exerted greater 
influences into Central Asia, which has long been considered as the sphere of 
influence of Russia, to gain access to natural resources. (Marantidou & Cossa，2014) 
The Chinese government has been intended to initiate bilateral energy deals with 
Central Asian countries separately through the hands of the China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) and Sinopec. (Zhuangzhi, 2007) For instance, China have 
energy cooperation with Kazakhstan in the Sino-Kazakh gas deal and Atasu-
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Alashankou pipeline project, with Turkmenistan such as the Sino-Central Asian gas 
pipeline and Amu Darya natural gas project, and with Uzbekistan in creating a joint 
venture, UzCNPC Petroleum. (Lamelle & Peyrouse, 2012) The Russian government 
is fear of losing strategic interests from its traditional backyard when the natural 
resources of Central Asia were re-export to Europe for manipulation and exertion of 
political influences. The Russian suspicious of encirclement has also been intensified 
following with the Chinese economic expansion in Central Asia.
Another geopolitical conflict between Russia and China has been occurred in the 
Russian Far East. The abundant of natural resources in East Siberian region is the 
backbone of Russian energy production. However, the depopulation of Russian and 
the growing Chinese population through migration in the Far East have generated 
Russia’s concerns over the thought of Chinese demographic invasion. (Zeihan, 2014) 
The threat perception that a strengthened China is prepared to invade the Russian Far 
East so as to penetrate the natural resources has also flooded in the Russian 
leadership.
The problem of status also mixed up the Sino-Russian alliance. There is an 
undeniable truth that both countries are unenthusiastic to serve as a junior partner to 
another when Russia is a traditional superpower and China is rising rapidly. (Trenin, 
2012) When compared with the state capabilities, the relatively weak Russia would
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suck into a junior partnership with China, similar to the role of Europe in the Atlantic 
alliance. Hence， the inferior status prevent Russia from creating formal alliance with 
the rising China.
On the whole, with the disparities, geopolitical conflicts and the status problem, 
the establishment of formal Sino-Russian alliance is questionable. Instead, the 
Russian government has been intended to hedge in Asia-pacific region. (J. Mankoff, 
2015) The Russia’s Asia pivot has constructed closer relations not only with China but 
also other Asian key players. For instance, Russia has explored cooperation with India 
in nuclear development, with Japan such as holding a “2+2” meetings， and with 
Vietnam in arms trade. The Russia’s closer ties with other Asian countries played a 
role in checking the rise of China in the region.
4.2.4 The United States would prepare for the worst
Although the formal Sino-Russian alliance is unlikely to materialize, the United 
States would prepare for the worst when the intentions of Russia and China are 
uncertain. The American diplomats would not underestimate the creation of informal 
alliance among Russia and China. The informal Sino-Russian coalition is inclined to 
soft balance the United States through non-military means. (Bergfeldt, 2008) The 
bandwagon, buck passing, free-riding and partial diplomatic coalitions are the 
common strategies both Russia and China used in checking the United States. For
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instance, Russia opposed the unilateral military actions of United States in Iraq 
through aligning other permanent member states in the United Nations Security 
Councils offer an example of soft balancing the United States.
Apart from the soft balancing, the United States would be cautious in further 
intensifying the Sino-Russian alliance. (Hancock & Lobell, 2014) When the Sino- 
Russian relations are in a large extent influenced by their relations with the West, the 
American foreign policies that severely offended two countries’ interest would trigger 
the advancement of Sino-Russian alliance.
Chapter 5; Russia; Geostrategic Resurgence in Energy
The Russian officials, including President Putin, have expressed their 
understandings of energy as a strategic resource not only to improve its economy but 
also exert greater geopolitical influences. (Schneider, 2014) In other words, the 
Russian energy deals with other states are compromised on business interests as well 
as the national interests. The rise of energy price and the use of “national champions，，， 
such as Gazprom & Transneft which are both monopolized after President Putin came 
to power, makes the Russian government effectively expand greater influences abroad 
through the manipulation of the energy weapon. The sustained economic growth 
produces a more assert Russia in defending its interests against the United States and
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having greater involvement globally through expansion.
5.1 Structural Realism over Energy
The realist perceives energy as a strategic commodity that obtaining energy 
security is one of the national objectives for states to pursue. (Belyi, n.d.) The energy 
security would be achieved for an energy exporting country when the export market is 
diversified, and for an energy consumer country when the sources of energy supply 
are expanded.
The realist’s state-centered approach is also upholding in the energy perspective. 
(Beri, 2009) The structural realist theories suggested Russia as an energy exporting 
country would maximize its relative power through energy trade to accumulate 
national wealth and ultimately protect the national security. However, states are 
cautious in cooperating in politically sensitive area such as energy resources since the 
structural realist see cooperation conducted in an asymmetric way that benefit a state 
more than another (Wieclawski, 2011)
5.2 Gas Weapon and Pipeline Diplomacy
The Russian government is intended to use natural gas rather than oil as a 
predominant energy weapon. The natural gas is the most valuable Russian energy 
weapon due to its nature and the tremendous reserves of Russia. In contrast to oil 
which is less vulnerable for industrial states on account of the diversified sources of
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supply in the global market, natural gas is shipped through pipeline linked directly 
from exporters to importers. (Shaffer, 2009) Hence, the transactions of natural gas are 
principally compromised in bilateral and long-term agreements. (AEMC, 2015)The 
gas trades are also less diversified than oil as a consequence of logistical constraints 
that involve high costs and lengthy time in constructing transport infrastructures. The 
bilateral energy cooperation offers Russia a leverage to influence another state’s 
politics. For instance, the use of gas disruption such as the blockage of natural gas 
supply to Ukraine demonstrates how the Russian use energy weapons to shape the 
Ukrainian policies.
5.2.1. Control over Former Soviet Republics
The first objective Russia pursuit through its energy weapons is the control over 
the post-Soviet states. The Russian government is intended not only to reduce 
dependence on the transit state, but also to create energy dependence in post-Soviet 
space.
Due to the unfavorable weather conditions that most of the Russian ports could 
not operate throughout the year， the export of Russia’s energy is dependent on the 
transit states, such as Belams and Ukraine. (Chyong, 2014) The Russian dependency 
on transit states would be potentially exploited by the transit states to obtain greater 
interests. Moreover, the dependency would also generates instability of energy exports
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when most gas disruption are initiated by the transit states. (Shaffer，2009) For 
example， the Russia’s gas exports to Europe were affected when Russia has cut off 
gas supply to Ukraine. Consequently, Russia is intended to reduce dependency over 
the transit states through energy policies.
Acquiring energy transport infrastructures in the neighboring countries is the 
Russian’s strategy in reducing dependency on the transit states. The Russian 
government has adopted a carrot and stick approach to gain control of the pipeline 
network in the neighboring states. (Robinson, 2014) On one hand, Russia provides 
incentives to its neighboring countries, such as offering a more reasonable gas price in 
order to acquire the local transport and distribution networks. For instance, Armenia 
and Belarus endorsed Russia’s purchase of its domestic energy infrastructure in 
exchange for energy subsidies. On the other hand, the neighboring states who refused 
to support Russia’s acquisitions have been punished. Georgia and Azerbaijan are the 
example who rejected to abandon the domestic pipeline networks and accordingly 
were told to pay the higher European price. The Russian’s control over the pipeline 
networks in its neighboring countries would weaken its dependency on the transit 
states. In addition, Russia has built the alternative pipelines to export energy in direct 
routes that bypass the unstable transit states. (Socor, 2014) The Nord Stream Pipeline 
that directly linked up Germany and Russia has showed the Kremlin’s effort in
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bypassing the transit countries. In contrast to the traditional export routes, the Nord 
Stream pipeline allows Russia to directly export natural gas to Germany. By reducing 
the dependency on the transit states, the Russian government is regaining political 
leverage over its neighboring countries.
Apart from bypassing the transit states, Russia has also deliberately created the 
energy dependence for the former Soviet states. The lower gas price charged for the 
natural gas destined to the post-Soviet states through energy subsidies is a strategy for 
the Russian to create gas dependence in its near abroad. (Woehrel, 2009) Russia 
would exert political influences through the threat of charging higher “market” price 
or intimidation of gas disruption. For instance， the Russia—Ukraine gas dispute in 
2006 was perceived as a political issue rather than an economic dispute. The Russian 
gas supply to Ukraine was cut-off since Ukraine refused to fulfil Russia’s request of 
paying the “market” gas price. The application of the gas dispute is that Russia would 
exclude energy subsidy to those countries that align closer with the West, such as 
Ukraine after the former President Yushchenko came to power.
5.2.2 Dominate European Gas Market
Another objective of the Russian energy policy is to preserve its position as the 
major exporter of natural gas in Europe. In 2012, Russia exported 32% of natural gas 
consumed in the EU. (Eurostat, 2015) The Kremlin has successfully created energy
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dependence among the EU, especially in the Eastern Europe. For instance, when the 
Baltics states and Finland completely rely on Russian gas for domestic consumption, 
Russian also export accounts for more than three-quarters of natural gas imports in 
Slovakia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Greece. The reliance on Russian natural gas 
would pose a vulnerability of the EU towards Russia’s political leverage and 
influence.(Jacobs, 2015)
Aside from the domination of gas market of the EU, the Russian leaderships are 
also ambitious in acquiring the domestic pipeline networks in Europe. As anticipated, 
the Russian government financially supports Gazprom through the sovereign 
investment fund to purchase the downstream assets in Europe. (Arevordi, 2008) The 
Gazprom’s asset swap with Wintershall was an example that the Russian energy giant 
acquired the natural gas storage facilities in Germany and Austria. The Kremlin’s 
attempts to acquire downstream assets in Europe further raise the concerns of EU over 
energy security, especially when the purchase lacks reciprocal commitment. (Belyi, 
2009) The Russian government has been reluctant in compromising with the EU over 
the Energy Charter Treaty. The refusal of this energy instrument allows Russia to keep 
restraining the access of European petroleum businesses to Russian distribution 
networks.
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5.2.3. The Diversity of Enersv Exports in Asia
Russia, as a natural gas exporter, seek for diversity of the export market 
alongside with Europe. The geographical location of Russia placed in Eurasia 
provides two directions of energy export routes and export markets in Europe and 
Asia. The diversity would strengthen Russia’s security with variety of export options. 
(Goodrich & Lanthemann, 2013)
When the diversification of energy export market is accomplished, the variety of 
export markets delivers a bargaining chip for Russia to raise the price of exported gas 
to Europe. (Shaffer, 2009) The Russian government has developed an alternative 
export market in Asia after the long term gas deals was signed with China. 
Consequently, the excessive demand of Russian natural gas would occur when the 
Russian gas exports are insufficient to fulfil the combined demand from Europe and 
China. The competition of Russian gas exports among Europe and China would 
motivate the rise of gas price. Hence, the Russian government benefits from the 
diversity of energy export markets in the enhancement of security and the potential 
rise of gas price.
5.3. Perception & Misperception
Whether the notion of Russia’s energy weapons is valid depend on the energy 
dependency between Russia and the EU. In general, the EU would suffer an
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asymmetric interdependence relations with Russia in the short term. Finding a 
substitute of Russian natural gas supply would be challenging for the EU when the 
alternative import capability is limited due to the weighty bill of constructing pipeline 
infrastructure. (DE MICCO, 2014) Yet， the natural gas supply relations in the long 
term would be interdependent when the EU has sufficient time in finding alternative 
supply and Russia could also find a substituted export market.
The Western energy experts are more inclined to illustrate the E.U.-Russian 
natural gas supply relations as interdependent. (Harsem & Harald Claes, 2013) The 
history of the absence of gas disruption for more than 30 years justified the relative 
symmetry of dependence between Russia and the EU in gas trade. The speeches from 
the Russian officials that when the EU have little supply options Russia is also short 
of alternative markets, further validated the interdependence between Russia and the 
EU.
However, Russia’s assertive conducts has demonstrated the interpretation of 
Russian government towards its energy relations with Europe. The Russia-Ukrainian 
gas dispute in 2006 proved that Russia is prepared to abandon the interest of Europe 
and the image as a reliable exporters when it comes to the geopolitical issues with its 
near abroad. The Russian’s gas cutoff without frightening of Europe’s payback 
illustrated that Russia takes European energy demand as granted. Beside, the recent
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Ukraine crisis also showed the Europe’s worries of interruption of energy imports 
from Russia. The gas supply cut-offs would be more detrimental to the European than 
the Russian who would lose hard currency from energy exports. These events have 
acknowledged the asymmetric interdependency among the energy relations between 
the EU and Russia.
Furthermore, despite the fact that there has been much more variety of gas 
diversification projects, the willpower of European member states to counter Russian 
energy dependence is questionable. (Umbach，n.d.) The Kremlin has penetrated some 
European countries and politicians through economic interests in exchange for their 
support of Russian-backed projects. For instance, the South Stream pipeline which 
would maintain the EU’s gas dependence on Russia is supported by Bulgaria, Austria， 
Italy and other European states. Therefore, the failure of acting in solidarity with other 
EU member states would remain European dependence on Russia’s natural gas 
supply.
5.4 The Reactions of the United States
Although the Russian energy weapons would not pose a direct security threat to 
the United States, since the United States is not a component of Russia’s pipeline 
networks and is certainly not importing gas from Russia， the EU’s gas dependence on 
Russia would destabilize the unities within the West. (Kemp，2014) The failure of
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acting in accords among the United States and European Union would undermine its 
capabilities in confronting Russia. Consequently, the United States has different 
approaches in reacting the Russian energy weapons.
The United States has encouraged the building of pipelines that bypass Russia’s 
monopolized pipeline networks to undermine the dependence on Russia. The 
proposed pipelines that offer an alternative source of energy supply would enhance 
the energy security of Europe with a greater bargaining with Russian gas companies. 
For instance, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is a crude oil pipeline 
supported by the United States with the purpose of strengthening global energy 
security through diversity. (Blum, 2002) The pipeline project Russia refused to 
participate would deteriorate the Russian influence in the Caucasus and would further 
diversify the global oil supply that threaten to Russia’s interests. Another pipeline 
bypassing Russia is the Nabucco pipeline which is a natural gas pipeline expected to 
diversify the natural gas supply and export routes for Europe. The U.S. backed 
Nabucco pipeline allows European countries to gain access to the natural gas sources 
in the Caspian Sea in order to reduce the dependence on Russian natural gas. (Dickel， 
2014)
On the other hand, the effectiveness of the pipeline projects intended to diversify 
global energy supply is questionable with the strong opposition from Russia. The
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Russian government would make their efforts to paralyze these projects, such as 
persuading other European countries to reject. The Kremlin is also proposed to create 
rivalry pipelines such as the Blue Stream, South European Gas Pipeline, and South 
Stream pipeline. (Than & Kahn, 2015) The competition of pipelines would be a 
foreseeable battlefield among the United States and Russia in competing the 
geostrategic interests from energy.
In addition, the development of the shale gas is another strategy for the United 
States to counterbalance Russia’s energy weapons. The availability of shale gas 
potentially expand the global energy supply and provide substitute of the Russian 
natural gas supply. (Bordoff & Houser, 2014) There is no doubt that under the 
principle of free market the American government would unlikely interfere the export 
destinations of shale gas based on geopolitical interests. The shale gas in the United 
States is expected to be exported to Asian market which is a most profitable export 
market for the American petroleum companies. Although the United States is less 
likely to displace Russia’s gas supply to Europe， the development of shale gas helps 
reforming the gas markets into a more competitive platform. (Forbes, 2013) The 
United States’ role as a backup of global gas supply protect the Europe from the 
energy dependence on Russia that the energy cooperation between EU and Russia 
would return to an equal footing. The efforts of the United States’ shale gas to
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diversify global energy supply is possible when the West has rapidly develop the 
distribution infrastructure with the aim of diversity.
Chapter 6: Russian Revisionism in its Near Abroad
6.1 Case Study: The Russo-Georgian War
The Russo-Georgian War was a military conflict between Russia and Georgia. 
The Russian troops were deployed officially as a peacekeeper to participate the 
fighting in the Transcaucasia region. Eventually， the breakaway republics of South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia declared the independence and Russian military has occupied 
these republics after the war. The Five-day War has indicated a revival of global 
rivalry to compete for the sphere of influences based on geopolitical considerations in 
the post-Soviet space.
6.1.1 Georsia is turnins to the West
Georgia has come closer in the relations with the Western camp and been 
intended to separate itself from the Moscow’s control. On one hand， the Georgian 
government wished for building greater relations with the West after President 
Saakashvili was elected following with the Rose revolutions. President Saakashvili 
introduced the Westernize policies not only by launching political and economic 
reforms, but also declared the intentions of joining the NATO and EU.
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(EURODIALOGUE, 2012)
On the other hand, the West is also keen to coopt this former Soviet satellite state 
based on strategic calculation. Georgia has played a fundamental role in diversity of 
the energy supply in Europe and weakening Russia’s domination in energy delivery 
routes. The Georgian government has participated in the South Caucasus Pipeline and 
Nabucco pipeline, which provides an alternative energy sources to European countries 
from the Caspian Sea. The diversification of natural gas supply is strategic importance 
in the sense that weakening the Russian leverage to the European countries and 
reducing European dependence on Russian energy. (Nuriyev, 2007)
Apart from the strategic interests of energy diversification, Georgia also delivers 
security and economic benefits to the West. Georgia has significant security 
cooperation with the West. For instance， Georgia formed the air corridor with 
Azerbaijan to facilitate the NATO’s accesses over Afghanistan. (Muzalevsky，2010) 
Furthermore, when the Georgian deployment of troops become the largest contributor 
of non-NATO states in the Afghanistan mission, the capabilities of Georgian military 
have been enhanced thanks to the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) funded 
by the United States. (Davey，2010) The European states also provides a market for 
Georgia as an alternative of Russian market.
The confrontation between the United States and Russia was escalated
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specifically after the further extension of the NATO membership of Georgia and 
Ukraine. The Bucharest NATO Summit Declaration asserted that both Georgia and 
Ukraine would ultimately join the institutions once the requirements of membership 
are accomplished. (Gallis, 2008) The further engagement among the West and the 
post-Soviet states with the promise of memberships have frustrated the Russian 
government. The closer association justified Russia’s desire to preserve its sphere of 
influences through the invasion of Georgia. The NATO Bucharest summit motivated 
Russia’s rapid military response that Russia initiated the Russo-Georgian War three 
weeks after the summit held.
6.1.2 The Response of Russia
The well-prepared Russian invasion of Georgia has illustrated the Russia’s desire 
of preserving its interest in the post-Soviet states. The assertiveness of Russia in 
confronting the West’s expansion in Georgia was demonstrated before the Russo- 
Georgian War. In 2007, Russia deployed an unmarked Russian military aircraft to 
penetrate Georgian airspace and arranged a Russian fighter jet to fire air-to-surface 
weapons in Georgia. (Sadri & Burns，2010) The “silence” of the OSCE report 
investigating these incidents and refusing to criticize Russia assured Russia’s further 
aggression. (Cornell，Popjanevski， & Nilsson，2007)
The preparation of Russian in the Russo-Georgian War could trace back the
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events long before from the Georgian attack on South Ossetia. For instance， the 
Russian government delivered passports to the populations of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia in 2002, after Russia introduced visa regime with Georgia in 2000. The 
distribution of Russian passport has placed the foundation of the creeping annexation 
of two breakaway Georgian regions. Moreover, few months earlier than the crisis, the 
Russian military had moved the railway soldiers to the Caucasus to establish the 
logistical routes, moved the combat groups on positions and filled up the supply 
dumps. (Sadri & Bums, 2010)
In the crisis, the Moscow described the Russian military deployment as a "peace 
enforcement" operation to counter Georgia’s aggressive military actions in South 
Ossetia. The Russian proclamations of the rights to protect the Russian minority in 
Georgia and their right to self-determination were intended to offer a legal foundation 
for Russia’s aggressiveness. (Kolst0, 1993) While Russia invade Georgia and 
recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia eventually 
suffered limited punishments from the West except for severe international criticisms. 
6.13. The Implications of the Five-Day War
The Russo-Georgian war offers four implications among the confrontation 
between the United States and Russia.
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Projection of Russia’s Privileged Interests in the Region
First, the Russian asserted its privileged interests in the CIS region that the 
United States should respect Russians geopolitical interests and the Russian- 
dominated regional order. (Kramer, 2008) In other words, the Russian government 
signaled the high prices for the West’s fUrther expansions in the region. Thus， the 
Russian adventurism in Georgia prevents Georgia and Ukraine from joining the 
NATO.
Exploitation of the spilt over the West
Second, Russia was exploiting the division among the Europe and the United 
States. In response to Russian aggression in Georgia， the EU is divided into “Russian- 
friendly” and “Russia-hostile” camps. (Rettman，2010) For instance， the pro-Russian 
camp led by France and Germany block the proposals of the suspension of NATO- 
Russia Council and the issue of a hostile statement against Russia. France and 
Germany initially also opposed the United States’ supports over the NATO 
membership to Georgia and Ukraine in the Bucharest summit. The Europe’s 
comprehensive business and energy ties with Russia prevents its institutions from 
adopting an antagonistic approach against Russia. Without the overwhelming supports 
from Europe, the United States was also reluctant to confront against Russia, given 
the Obama Administration’s agenda o f ‘reset’ policy with Russia. The Russian
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government eventually achieved its political goals through the invasion of Georgia 
without severe costs from the West except for international criticism and objections. 
The Georgia war also demonstrated how Russia exploits the weaknesses of the EU- 
U.S. spilt.
Revenge of Kosovo Crisis
Third, Russia is playing the revenge game to the West. The NATO unilateral 
actions in the Kosovo crisis， which ignored Russia’s interests in Serbia， triggered 
severe opposition from Russia. (J. Mankoff 1977, 2012) The warning of Russian 
officials that the independence of Kosovo set a precedent for the independence of the 
separatist regions in the post-Soviet states was also disregarded by the West. 
Accordingly, declaring the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is the 
feedbacks of the West’s humiliations to Russia. (Shevtsova，2010) The West’s 
recognition of Kosovo’s independence also restricted the American’s criticisms over 
Russia in the crisis or the double standard of the West would be signified.
The Use of Hybrid Warfare
In addition， Russia used a strategy of ‘hybrid warfare’ that combine conventional 
warfare with irregular forces and cyberwar in the crisis over Georgia. Apart from 
deploying conventional force into Georgia, Russia has other means of attacks in terms 
of unconventional forces. (Ancker, 2003) For instance, Russia has imposed economic
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sanctions against Georgia after the controversy of Georgian—Russian espionage in 
2006. The information warfare is another Russian’s strategy in the Russo-Georgian 
war. (Giles, 2011) Russia used the propaganda through national Television channel to 
gain popular supports from the separatist regions. While the television footage spread 
over the Georgian atrocities, the Russian military actions were labelled as rescuing the 
Russian citizens. Further, cyber-attacks were also involved by the Russian to swamp 
and disable the website of Georgian organizations. (Lomidze, 2011)
6.2. Case Study: The Ukrainian Crisis
When Russia accomplish diplomatic parity with the United States in the Syrian 
crisis and the grant of asylum of Edward Snowden， the Ukraine crisis was not an 
isolated diplomatic accident but a deliberate actions that indicate a restart of East- 
West confrontation. (Trenin, 2014)
The Ukraine crisis was initiated by the former Ukrainian President Yanukovych’s 
decision of abandoning the free trade agreements with the European Union and 
instead seeking for closer integration with Russia. Afterwards, thousands of people 
protested in Kiev and Yanukovych eventually fled to Russia. In response, the Russian 
government annexed Crimea and legitimated the invasion through holding the 
Crimean status referendum. The conflicts in Donbass have persisted despite of the
ceasefire deal of “Minsk Agreement”.
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6.2.1. The Russian Assression 
Defending of Russia’s Security Interests
The actions of Russian government in the crisis are intended to defend its vital 
interests in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine has posed a threat to Russia when Ukraine 
is turning to the West that is flooded with the pro-Western elites and anti-Russian 
nationalists. (Trenin，2014) The potential shift of Ukraine would hamper Russia’s 
dominant position it this former Soviet republics and more importantly lead to the 
membership of NATO. Preventing Ukraine from joining NATO is the major objective 
of the Kremlin to maintain its position in the CIS region. Further, the zero-sum 
thinking is rooted in Russian leadership that the loss of Ukraine would challenge 
Russia’s security and strengthen encirclement from the West. (WashingtonsBlog， 
2014) The integration of Ukraine into the Western institutions of NATO would also 
infer Ukraine’s denial of Russian-led Eurasian Union with the purpose of post-Soviet 
integration. Thus, the zero-sum mentality motivated Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. 
Strategic Importance of Crimea
The Russia’s argument of the protection of national security is sensible given the 
strategic importance of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea would allow the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet to be based Sevastopol that strengthen Russia’s capability to project 
its naval power. The Russian government has emphasized on the significance of
73
Structural Realism and the New Cold War
foreign naval bases, which are the geostrategic instrument for Russia to revive its 
status of global power. (Rogoway，2014) For instance， the access of Russia’s only 
Mediterranean naval port in Syria’s Tartus motivated Russia’s support of Assad 
regime. The presence of Russian naval base in the Black Sea deters the entry of 
NATO ships into the region as well as allows Russian annexation over the entire 
Ukraine as a leverage to manipulate Ukrainian foreign policy. Thus， the Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea could be based on long term strategic consideration.
The Use of Hybrid Warfare
Although the Russian government is intended to launch a full scale of 
confrontation against the West, Russia’s flexible strategy in the Ukraine crisis 
prevents direct military conflict with the West. With the weakness of conventional 
military capabilities, the Kremlin adopted a strategy of hybrid warfare that combine 
regular and irregular means of attack. Alongside with the unofficial involvement of 
Russian troops, the irregular Russian forces includes sanctions， energy disruption, 
political destabilization, information warfare, and cyber-attack. (Lucas, 2014) For 
instance， the Kremlin has sent the “Russian volunteer forces” and the “little green 
men55 to support pro-Russian separatists in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The Russia 
government also threaten the gas supply cut-offs to Ukraine because of Ukraine’s 
stealing of Russian gas supplying to Europe and destabilize Ukraine’s integrity
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through the war in Donbass. The information and cyber warfare were also launched
through the propaganda of national televisions since most Ukrainians watch Russian­
speaking broadcasting, and through cyber-attack such as DDoS attacks and tampering.
(Schindler, 2014)The variety of Russian irregular forces plus the nuclear deterrence
provide Russia an effective weapons to destabilize Ukraine and invade Crimea
without violation of the international law. When Russia avoid the abuse of
international law， the West have no legitimacy in responding militarily. The Moscow’s 
hybrid warfare in Ukraine generate a preferable result for Russia that acquire 
territories of its neighboring countries with impunity.
The Lack of solidarity between the West
Apart from the designated Russian hybrid warfare, the division of the West 
would also be illustrated in the Ukraine crisis. The Europe led by Germany and 
France initially respond the crisis differently with the United States through appeasing 
Russia to prevent further Russian aggression triggered by the confrontational 
approach. (Kanet, 2009) Although the EU cooperates with the United States to impose 
economic sanctions against Russia, the negotiation has spent a long time to 
compromise given the business and energy interdependence among the EU and 
Russia. The sanctions imposed by European Union are less confrontational than the 
U.S. that the EU sectorial sanctions were cautiously drafted to protect the interests of
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European businesses. For instance, while the EU restrictions on the energy 
exploration applies to future deals only, the American companies were required to 
undo the current energy projects. (Archick & Mix, 2015) The European Union is also 
reluctant in imposing additional sanctions to Russia, when the current imposed 
sanctions expire at July 2015. Some European countries are even seeking for lifting 
the sanctions against Russia to maintain its own economic interests. Hence, the EU- 
U.S. spilt was demonstrated through the differences of sanctions imposed by the 
United States and EU respectively.
6.2.2. Perception & Misperception
The Ukraine crisis has become a blame game between the United States and 
Russia that shifts the responsibility to another reciprocally. Indeed, the Ukraine crisis 
was a product of the uncertainty about each other’s intentions and thus interpreting 
another’s security measures as an aggressive behavior.
The Russian government criticized the Ukraine crisis was a product of the United 
States5 unilateral imperialism. The expansion of the West in the CIS region was 
perceived by the Kremlin as a challenge to Russia that is intended to infringe Russia’s 
sphere of influence. (Rasmussen，2014) Following the Moscow’s logic， the Ukrainian 
revolution that protested in Kiev and overthrew President Yanukovych was motivated 
not by the people’s power but by the United States. (J. Mankoff 1977, 2012)
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Therefore, the Russian aggression in Ukraine was a defense measure in response to 
the United States’ imperialism in the region.
On the other hand, the United States regarded Russian aggression as a revisionist 
action that contributes to the Ukraine crisis. The Washington recognized the Russian 
invasion of Ukraine is motivated by its ambitions in acquiring Ukraine for the 
Eurasian integration. (Trenin，2014) The violence in Ukraine offers a bargaining chip 
to Russia to intimidate and blackmail the Ukrainian government to rejoin the Russian 
sphere of influence. The contribution of Ukraine in the Eurasian integration enhance 
capabilities of the alliance and ultimately permit the revisionist Russia reshaping the 
global order. Hence, the United States considered the Ukraine crisis as a product of 
the Russian revisionism.
6.2.3. The Reactions of the United States
The United States react the Russian aggression in Ukraine crisis through the 
political，economic， and military means. Politically， the West’s inter-state and 
institutional cooperation with Russia has been withheld. For instance， Russia has been 
expelled from the Group of Eight (G8) and its relations with the EU and NATO are 
also deteriorated. Economically, the West has imposed economic sanctions such as 
travel bans and asset freezes against the specific Russian personnel and business. 
Militarily, the U.S.-led military institution NATO is adopting a more confrontational
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against Russia. Accordingly, the West has launch a full scale confrontation response to
the Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Chapter 7: Conclusion
The Ukrainian Crisis has illustrated the revival of international confrontation 
between the United States and Russia and the collapse of post-Cold-War status quo. 
The Russian government would be expected to be more provocative in defending its 
interests against the United States.
In the CIS region, the main objective of Russia is to prevent the former Soviet 
republics turning to the West and return to the Eurasian integration. On one hand, the 
Kremlin is acquiring more bargaining chips to deter the post-Soviet states from 
joining NATO. For instance， the war in Donbass illustrates not Russia’s desire of 
territory gain but its manipulation of Ukraine’s policy. On the other hand， Russia 
could also invade its neighboring countries such as the Baltic States to strengthen its 
security.
In Europe, the more “independent” role of EU between the United States and 
Russia is a good news for the Kremlin. The EU is hesitant to follow the United States’ 
strategy against the perceived revisionist states based on its interests. For instance, the 
major Western European countries are joining the Asian Infrastmcture Investment
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Bank (AIIB) proposed by China， despite of the United States’ discouragement. The 
prospect of the joint strategy between the West against Russia is also questionable 
when considering the extensive EU-Russian business and energy relationship. The 
United States’ economic weapons against Russia would be weakened without the 
support of Europe, given the underdeveloped U.S.-Russian economic ties.
In Asia-pacific region, the China factor would be the battleground between the 
United States and Russia according to the strategic triangle. While the United States 
offer economic initiatives to China, the Sino-Russian coalition is strategic attractive in 
order to offset the United States’ hegemony. Yet， the Sino-Russian cooperation in a 
large extent is the unintentional consequences triggered by the American’s policies. 
The American’s assertiveness in the region and its sanctions against Russia 
threatening both countries’ interests has encouraged the greater integration between 
Russia and China.
The recent tension between the United States and Russia is comparable with the 
Cold War period. According to the structural realist， the escalation of struggles are 
foreseeable generated by the misperception and over-exaggerations. Consequently, the 
balance of power would be reestablished and the new Cold War would also be 
emerged after the repeated intensification of conflicts. The recent development of the 
Ukrainian crisis that the United States5 troop deployment in Ukraine would be a
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turning point to initiate the new Cold War, just like the Berlin Blockade which 
signified the Cold War.
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